The Current Balance of Power: Defining Polarity with the Rise of China, Emerging Powers, and Ongoing Conflicts

Illustration by Bodhi Harrison

We are currently living in uncertain times in the international landscape. Challenges are being made against the international status quo and balance of power that was established by the U.S. and its allies following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Contemporary debates now surround what type of international system currently exists with its given balance of power. This piece educates on these debates and answers: How can the current international system be defined?

Starting with concepts, definitions, and perspectives, a framework is established to then review the system’s current polarity. America and China are predominantly considered due to a lack of other powers that can fit a challenger status, but also since what was expected to be a swift victory in Ukraine, exposed severe military and economic weaknesses for Russia. We then conclude with a critical assessment of the debate and polarity’s methodological issues. I argue: The current system is uni-multipolar due to U.S. predominance in traditional measurements and apparent independent national interests amongst second-tier powers who compete with one another and with tertiary powers in their respective regions. However, polarity itself should only be used as a starting point to power inquiries and not go beyond that as it has significant conceptual and application issues.

Polarity in international relations is a method that measures the power distribution among nation-states and coalitions/blocs in an international system. Traditional power measurements typically measure control over resources—economic, military, technological, and geopolitical capacities, and/or control over actors—a state’s hard and soft power abilities to influence or control the actions, preferences, and decisions of other states.[1]

The method defines three systems. Unipolarity has one predominant power whose capabilities are fundamentally unmatched by any other power(s).[2] Bipolarity requires parity between two dominant powers’ capabilities. Both wield control over international affairs, creating a zero-sum game where lesser powers join either of the two powers’ blocs.[3] Multipolarity consists of at least three significant powers.[4] Here, states can alter relationships with one another with little repercussion, yet resolving international issues requires multilateralism.[5] Importantly, in bi-and-multipolarity, there is frequent and systemic power-balancing, whereas unipolarity has no meaningful power-balancing efforts against the unipole since it holds predominance.[6]

Contemporary debates include some who believe the system is multipolar due to an emerging range of divergent interests amongst states and a significantly decreased share of power between America and China.[7] Others argue it’s bipolar and will remain so because America and China’s capacities are unmatched, creating an all-encompassing rivalry.[8] Those opposing both claim there’s a “partial unipolarity” which won’t shift for decades due to the dominance of U.S. capacities.[9] Below, we assess the polarity of the current system.

Starting with economic metrics, America retains the largest and strongest economy with a $10.2 billion gap in GDP over China.[10] Moreover, no other power comes close to America’s staggering leads in global corporate profit shares and R&D investing.[11] Importantly, post-pandemic, America’s economy has fully recovered and grown, while China’s has stagnated and even declined, indicating it may not economically displace America for the foreseeable future.[12] Yet, if China is able to correct its economic woes and current trends continue, the Chinese economy could surpass America’s by 2035.[13]

Demographically, China may face a dire population crisis. Projections expect a decrease of almost half its population by 2100.[14] Extrapolating this, China’s rapidly declining working-age population poses serious issues of providing for its aging population. The U.S. population, however, is expected to remain stable and when put together with its alliance blocs, it will be competitive with China this next century.[15]

Regarding other powers, India’s demographics are incredibly strong. Yet their prevalent poverty hinders their ability to translate its demographics into significant power projection, negating its challenger status until late this century.[16] In total, in the near-term, China will maintain a significant population, holding over 50 million young males to the U.S.’s 12 million.[17] However, America checks off the first box of economic power, retaining the strongest and largest economy, but this is likely tentative.  

Militarily, there’s evidence that America holds a lead over China in every key military category. America’s unmatched defense spending and military R&D investments have maintained its technologically superior military material and in turn its command over the sea, air, land, and space.[18] In the past three years, however, measurements have become blurred. China has conducted the most rapid military build-up since World War II. Along with China holding the world's largest number of active troops, its defense firms have produced hundreds of military assets and doubled its nuclear arsenal, making them now competitive with the U.S.’s leviathans (i.e., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, etc.).[19]

There are two possible ways to make a distinction between the two powers’ military capacities. The first, which is most shaky for arguing U.S. military dominance, is U.S.-Chinese wargame simulations. These indicate the U.S. would prevail in most scenarios in a conflict over Taiwan, leaving China completely devastated. However, the cost of Taiwan’s defense would be steep. Hundreds of military assets and tens of thousands of American troops would be lost, but also, America’s global standing would be diminished for many years[20] and the world’s economy would likely fall into crisis.[21]

Second, in projection capabilities, China is likely limited to only Taiwan and a while out from being capable of threatening Japan.[22] This is part due to its lacking military sophistication but also its unfavorable geographical position where it’s flanked by “distrustful neighbors” who hedge against its rise.[23] Conversely, America can still “go global” responding to aggressors with severe hard power and economic punishments through its deeply embedded alliance structures.[24]

This has been apparent in President Biden’s recent Indo-Pacific military build-up, deployment of nuclear-capable military assets to the region, and enhanced partnerships like AUKUS. These actions have increased the level of complexity for Chinese contingencies and created multiple “pathways to preclude Chinese efforts to overturn the status quo.”[25] This all indicates an apparent—yet slipping—American military advantage over China, checking off the second power criteria box.

Diplomacy-wise, we bring in the emerging middle powers[26] whose strong demographics and rising economies have enhanced their geopolitical capacities and formed independent interests.[27] China has targeted such powers and other Global South nations through efforts like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has 150 member-states, and offers great incentives (i.e., Chinese foreign investments for infrastructure) to joining an alternative world order to the U.S.’s.[28]

With efforts like the BRI, China has been successful in embedding such initiatives in the UN. This has paid dividends. In 2023, China’s influence over its initiative’s member-states successfully voted to quash debate in the UN’s Human Rights Council over China’s human rights abuses against its Uyghur population. However, the effectiveness of these efforts in swaying public opinion is unclear and amongst key Asian leaders, there remains a preference for further U.S. alignment. Globally too, U.S. foreign investment remains more desired than China’s.[29]

Additionally, the Russo-Chinese led BRICS+ aims to transpose the global dollar-standard.[30] This conglomerate now makes up 45 percent of the world’s population, 30 percent of oil output, and 35 percent of purchasing power parity (PPP)—compared to the G7’s 27 percent PPP.[31] However, BRICS+ also appears divided with diverging interests over its objectives. Some members want the organization to be a tool for coalescing against the U.S. Others want to utilize it to reform the system where powers can steer between the U.S. and China.[32]

America has issues too. The EU overlooks China’s involvement in Ukraine as China still makes up 15 percent of total EU trade.[33] China also remains Japan’s and most Asian state’s largest trading partner.[34] Furthermore, in a visit to China, German leadership recently stated it would make partnerships with all newly emerging “centers of power”[35] and France’s president noted that France wouldn’t follow America in matters (i.e., Taiwan) that don’t concern French interests.[36] In review, China has been making strides in growing its influence, yet its efforts are still met with skepticism and while there are emerging cracks in U.S. alliance structures, America maintains stronger alliances and global preference for its aid—checking off the final box of diplomatic power metrics.

One final aspect of power omitted from rudimentary assessments are Chinese covert cyber operations. China and its autocratic allies like Iran and Russia have conducted information warfare that aims to cause domestic chaos within America and spread disinformation globally. Using digital media platforms, they have attempted to undermine democracy by manipulating public opinion, eroding trust in the electoral system, and enhancing political divisions in the U.S. electorate.[37]

Internationally, Moscow’s disinformation campaign has been effective in keeping the middle powers neutral over their war in Ukraine while even growing resentment against America, framing it as a belligerent power.[38] China has bankrolled many of these efforts[39] and spends billions annually on digital censorship, disinformation, and propaganda across the globe.[40] While it’s hard, if not unrealistic, to measure efforts like these, they present new metrics and challenges to appraise a state’s ability to exert power and achieve its international objectives.

Moving to a critical assessment, we start with bipolarity advocates whose arguments don’t fit the bill. China hasn’t yet reached parity with U.S. capacities and the nature amongst both isn’t a zero-sum game. Here, multipolarity succeeds. Pertinent powers dominantly desire neutrality, navigating between America and China, while pursuing their interests. However, multipolarity isn’t resolved since America holds, albeit a dissipating, predominance and no other power is in the league of either America or China. 

Bi-and-multipolarity proponents might cite current power-balancing as evidence against unipolarity. However, U.S.-Israeli aid has produced successes against its adversaries and potentially ended Iran’s regional ascendency.[41] Moscow’s Ukraine miscalculation too has imposed significant stress on Russia’s military, exposing deficiencies, and serious economic obstacles to its survival.[42] Thus, these don’t pose meaningful power-balancing in traditional measurements as they aren't direct threats to America's near-term security and capacities. That said, multipolarity is correct with contemporary issues requiring multilateralism like NATO’s support for Ukraine, the EU’s sanctions against Russia, and Israeli balancing against Iran.

America, then, maintains an advantage with no meaningful balancing against it—negating true multipolarity, yet there’s apparent multilateralism and independent interests—questioning unipolarity. What’s to be made of this? Huntington (1991) provides a solution, “a strange hybrid,” where the system is uni-multipolar. The system consists of one predominant power in every power metric who has highly desired resources, letting it flex significant power to alter/negate other powers actions. But it still requires multilateralism for addressing international issues. Simultaneously, second-tier regional powers pursue their interests but compete with one another and tertiary powers in their respective regions.[43]

These secondary powers include China, India, and Japan in Asia; Germany, France, the EU, and Russia in Europe; Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the Middle East; South Africa and Egypt in Africa; and Brazil in South America. Such powers compete with one another (e.g., India and China over territorial disputes and their geo-political rivalry; the EU, Germany, and France against Russia over Ukraine; and Israel against Iran within the ongoing regional conflict). Then, there are the tertiary powers who compete with secondary powers in their respective regions (e.g., Pakistan and India’s rivalry; Britain’s Brexit against the EU and challenges to EU and NATO policy from the likes of Hungary and Türkiye, respectively; Lebanon in relation to Israel; and Argentina and Mexico’s geopolitical competition towards Brazil).

While the system is best described as uni-multipolar, polarity has conceptual and application issues. It over-simplifies the complexity of power and neglects critical factors like the force of ideology, culture, leaders’ characteristics, and covert methods that possibly have significant impacts on power. In addition, it’s unclear if polarity measurements create an adequate construct when attempting to predict and explain the likelihood of how a great power’s capabilities can be translated into achieving its international objectives. Consider the Vietnam War and the war in Afghanistan where the U.S. was on paper the clear military favorite in both. Yet, the Viet Cong prevailed in Vietnam and the war in Afghanistan became the longest American military conflict, reaching 20 years until it pulled out in 2021.

Clearly too, the method struggles to capture moments of power shifts or transitions, hence the need for a “uni-multipolar” concept. Polarity, moreover, cannot account for the interdependencies in such a globalized world and the lack of consistent and transparent data reporting from China creates skepticism for any of its measurements. Finally, on top of these, the lack of any consensus on the polarity of the current system and the wide range of different techniques used, displays its inadequacy as a normative method. Therefore, polarity should only be used as a starting point in power inquiries. Indeed, it can be a valuable tool in gaining a basic understanding, but it should not go beyond that, especially in foreign policy considerations and development.

Connor J.L. Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies.

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Notes

[1] Jeffrey Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization 30 no. 2 (Spring 1976), 289-291.

[2] William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 7.

[3] Paul Horness, “Understanding Paradigms and Polarity in International Relations.” 跡見学園女子大学人文学フォーラム (2015), 19.

[4] William C. Wohlforth, and Stephen G. Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power,” Foreign Affairs 102 no. 3 (May 2023), 2.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78 no. 2 (March 1999), 35-36.

[6] Horness, “Understanding Paradigms and Polarity in International Relations,” 19.

[7] Emma Ashford and Evan Cooper, “Yes the World Is Multipolar: And that isn’t bad news for the United States,” Foreign Policy (October 2023), 2.

[8] “No, the World Is Not Multipolar,” accessed 7 November 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/22/multipolar-world-bipolar-power-geopolitics-business-strategy-china-united-states-india/.

[9] Wohlforth and Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity,” 5.

[10] “The 20 countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024,” accessed 7 November 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268173/countries-with-the-largest-gross-domestic-product-gdp/.

[11] Wohlforth and Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity,” 4.

[12] “Tipped Power Balance: China’s Peak and the U.S. Resilience,” accessed 7 November 2024, https://www.cfr.org/blog/tipped-power-balance-chinas-peak-and-us-resilience.

[13] Ibid.

[14] “Key facts about China’s declining population,” accessed 20 October 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/12/05/key-facts-about-chinas-declining-population/.

[15] “China’s shrinking population and constraints on its future power,” accessed 20 October 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-shrinking-population-and-constraints-on-its-future-power/.

[16] Wohlforth and Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity,” 3.

[17] “Trump and the Future of American Power: A Conversation With Stephen Kotkin,” accessed 7 November, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trump-and-future-american-power-stephen-kotkin.

[18] Wohlforth and Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity,” 7.

[19] Seth G. Jones, “China Is Ready for War: And Thanks to a Crumbling Defense Industrial Base, America Is Not,” Foreign Affairs (October 2024), 3-4.

[20] Mark F. Cancian, et al, “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” Center for Strategic & International Studies (January 2023), 1-3.

[21] “If China invaded Taiwan it would destroy world trade, says James Cleverly,” accessed 10 October 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/25/if-china-invaded-taiwan-it-would-destroy-world-trade-says-james-cleverly.

[22] Wohlforth and Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity,” 7.

[23] Joshua Shifrinson, et al, “The Long Unipolar Moment? Debating American Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 102 no. 6 (November 2023), 165.

[24] Wohlforth and Brooks, “The Myth of Multipolarity,” 7.

[25] Mara Karlin, “The Return of Total War: Understanding—and Preparing for—a New Era of Comprehensive Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 103 no. 6 (November 2024), 17-18.

[26] Some of the middle powers include: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, India, Israel, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, and South Africa.

[27] Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, “Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2024), 1-5.

[28] Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Alternative Order: And What America Should Learn From It,” Foreign Affairs 103 no. 3 (May 2024), 12-15.

[29] Ibid., 19-20.

[30] “Why Are Latin American Dictators Seeking Membership in BRICS+?” accessed October 30 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-are-latin-american-dictators-seeking-membership-brics#:~:text=At%20the%20latest%20BRICS%20summit,summit%20in%20Johannesburg%2C%20South%20Africa.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs (September 2024), 2-4.

[33] Oriana S. Mastro, “China’s Agents of Chaos: The Military Logic of Beijing’s Growing Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs 103 no. 6 (November 2024), 29.

[34] Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Alternative Order: And What America Should Learn From It,” Foreign Affairs 103 no. 3 (May 2024), 21-22.

[35] Michael A. Peters, “The emerging multipolar world order: A preliminary analysis,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 55 no. 14 (2023), 1654.

[36] Mastro, “China’s Agents of Chaos,” 30.

[37] David R. Shedd and Ivana Stradner, “The Covert War for American Minds: How Russia, China, and Iran Seek to Spread Disinformation and Chaos in the United States,” Foreign Affairs (October 2024), 2-3.

[38] Daniel S. Hamilton and Angela Stent, “Can America Win Over the World’s Middle Powers? How to Push Back Against Russia’s Persistent Influence,” Foreign Affairs, (November 2023), 3-4.

[39] U.S. Department of State, People’s Republic of China Efforts to Amplify the Kremlin’s Voice on Ukraine (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2022).

[40] U.S. Department of State, How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment (Washington, D.C.: Government Engagement Center, 2023).

[41] “With US military support, Israel shifts Middle East power balance,” accessed 13 November 2024, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/israel-palestine/2024/10/08/with-us-military-support-israel-shifts-middle-east-power-balance/.

[42] “Ukraine War Takes a Toll on Russia,” accessed 13 November 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/ukraine-war-takes-toll-russia.

[43] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78 no. 2 (March 1999), 35-36.

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